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Adverse Modification of the Endangered
Species Act: Regulatory Impediment or
Tool?
Chuckie Sullivan
12 U. MASS. L. REV. 166

ABSTRACT
In the past, the agencies charged with the implementation of the Endangered Species
Act have shirked invoking the full range of regulatory tools at their disposal. They
altered the structure of the Act in violation of Congressionally-granted authority to
better accommodate both developmental and conservation interests. After a string of
critical judicial decisions, the Services finally changed their implementation of the
Act to parallel the protections envisioned by Congress. Though these changes will
shift strength between provisions within the Act, they will not drastically alter the
status quo by allowing the Services discretion in making judgments regarding the
recovery of listed species and value of cost-benefit analysis.

AUTHOR NOTE
I would like to thank the staff of University of Massachusetts Law Review for their
assistance with this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

D

estruction of habitat is the leading threat to species in North
America.1 Congress was aware of this danger when enacting the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), and included powerful provisions to
protect endangered or threatened species and their habitats.2 In fact,
some commentators have categorized these provisions as the boldest in
the entirety of environmental law.3 Furthermore, the strongest
provisions in the Act protect the habitats of endangered species.4 The
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service
(“Services”), who are in charge of implementing the law, have
received judicial backlash for not following the intent of the Act.5 The
Services have recently altered their regulations to better adhere to the
law in accordance with these judicial objections. Though the question
remains: do the new regulations follow the fierce spirit of species
conservation intended by Congress? Furthermore, will the
implementation of such provisions actually alter the status quo? Or
will the agencies’ response to judicial mandates just promote form
over substance?
This paper argues the new regulatory scheme for adverse
modification provides the Services with the necessary flexibility to
customize habitat protection for endangered species, while
accommodating developmental interest and avoiding political
1

2

3

4
5

Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: Untangling and
Reviving Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1095, 1104 (2010) (citing Amy N. Hagen & Karen E. Hodges, Resolving
Critical Habitat Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, Policy, and Biology,
20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 399, 400 (2006)).
Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the
Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
129, 143 & n.65 (2004).
Sheila Baynes, Cost Consideration and the Endangered Species Act, 90
N.Y.U.L. REV. 961, 967 (2015) (citing Jonathan H. Adler, Perverse Incentives
and the Endangered Species Act, Resources for the Future (Aug. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC/Pages/08 08 04 Adler
Endangered Species.aspx).
Robbins, supra note 1, at 1103.
See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059
(9th Cir. 2004); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. United States Fish
& Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001); New Mexico Cattle Ass’n v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001).
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backlash. The agencies’ available discretion, however, will shift from
invoking adverse modification findings to designating critical habitat.
Part II of the paper will address the legal structure of the Act. Next,
Part III will address how the Services have interpreted the different
parts of the ESA. Part IV will then specifically examine specific data
regarding the Services’ implementation of the adverse modification
and critical habitat standards. In Part V and VI, the paper analyzes the
judicial rejection to the Services interpretation of the Act, and the
corresponding reaction by the Services. Finally, Part VII and VIII will
predict the impact of these changes and whether they will make any
difference to the status quo.
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved.”6 The main mechanism to achieve this
protection is to “list” a species as endangered or threatened.7 The
Services are responsible for making listing determinations and
enforcing the ESA to protect species on land and ocean.8 Such a listing
invokes a wide-range of strong protections.9
Critical habitat, a protection afforded by Congress to listed species,
is the only provision of the ESA aimed at promoting recovery, rather
than just survival, of a species.10 The ESA delineates the critical
habitat of a species to the areas “essential to the conservation of the
[listed] species and . . . which may require special management
considerations or protection” and areas outside the current habitat of
the species “essential for the conservation of the species.”11
6
7

8

9
10
11

16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012).
Id. § 1533(a)(1) (articulating the criteria for listing a species include: possible
destruction to habitat, overutilization, disease or predation, inadequacy of
regulatory mechanisms, or other natural or manmade factors affecting a species’
continued existence).
Id. § 1532(15). The Department of the Interior and Department of Commerce
house the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service,
respectively.
Id. § 1536(a)(2); id. 1538(a)(1).
Id. § 1532(5). See Robbins, supra note 1, at 1103–04.
Id. § 1532(5).
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“Conservation” under the Act is synonymous with recovery.12 Listing
requires the simultaneous demarcation of a species’ critical habitat, but
only to “maximum extent prudent and determinable.”13 The Services
may pass on making a critical habitat designation if the lack of data
makes the underlying scientific requisites impossible to ascertain14 or
“the costs of such exclusion outweigh the benefits.”15 Importantly,
unlike all other parts of the ESA, critical habitat benefits and costs can
include economic evaluations.16
A. Agency Consultations
Every federal “action” is subject to the ESA under Section 7.17 The
two substantive protections afforded to the Services under this section
involve minimizing jeopardy to the existence of a species and adverse
modification of a species’ critical habitat.18 These protections differ
from the prohibition of taking a listed species, which falls under
Section 9 and additionally applies to all non-federal parties.19
Substantively, Section 7 authority applies to “any action[s] authorized,
funded or carried out by [a federal] agency” that affect an endangered
species.20 In practice, the Services apply these protections to projects
undertaken on designated lands which require federal authorization,
receive federal funding or otherwise have a federal nexus.21 The

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

Id. § 1532(3) (defining “conserve” to mean any method necessary to “bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary”).
Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2)(i)–(ii) (2012).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
Id. (“The Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . after taking into
consideration the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.”). See
New Mexico Cattle Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th
Cir. 2001); Sinden, supra note 2.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
Id. § 1536(a)(2).
See id. § 1538.
Id. § 1536(a)(2)
Andrew J. Turner & Kerry L. McGrath, A Wider View of the Impacts of Critical
Habitat Designation: A Comment on Critical Habitat and the Challenge of
Regulating Small Harms, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10678, 10681–82 (2013).
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requirements do not apply to state, local, or tribal projects.22 A federal
agency must consult with the Services to ensure an action does not
violate either of these standards.23
The Section 7 consultation process protects millions of acres of
critical habitat.24 They usually begin with more informal negotiations,
allowing interested parties to modify their projects to comply with the
Services requirements.25 These modifications include conservation
measures that are binding conditions the agency must implement for
the project to gain approval by the Services.26 They also may include
conservation recommendations, which are non-binding conditions
protecting the listed species.27 Also, even if the Services find no
jeopardy or adverse modification will occur, they still may deem a
project to “take” a listed species under Section 9.28 In response, the
agencies issue “reasonable and prudent measures” which the action
agency must follow to reduce the level of take.29 The Services record
all of the attached measures in a published biological opinion.30 The
adherence to a biological opinion, though not formally binding, is
“virtually determinative” to whether a consulting agency may proceed
with an action.31 The implementation of these standards, however, is
very uneven and subject to much judicial review.32
22
23
24

25

26
27

28

29
30

31

32

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (imposing obligations on “each federal agency”).
See id. § 1536.
Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64
FLA. L. REV. 141, 151 (2012) (citing § 1536).
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., Endangered
Species Consultation Handbook (1998).
Owen, supra note 24, at 152.
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25,
at 4-62.
Owen, supra note 24, at 152; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, at xix (defining to “take” as “to harass, harm,
pursue hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in
any such conduct”).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012).
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25,
at 4-13–4-14.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997) (“The Service itself is, to put it
mildly, keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect of its biological
opinions.”).
See Robbins, supra note 1, at 1097-98.
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III. THE SERVICES’ INTERPRETATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ADVERSE MODIFICATION, JEOPARDY, AND TAKING
A proposed agency action cannot (1) jeopardize the continued
existence of any listed species, or (2) result in the destruction or
adverse modification of designated critical habitat.33 The Services
consider many different factors to quantify if these events will occur.
First, the agencies will consider a project’s relation to the species.34
The action agency should include a sufficiently detailed description of
the action to allow the Services to judge the overall to the surrounding
ecosystem.35 The Services will also weigh the species’ response to a
proposed action and account for the cumulative effects, which include
“future [s]tate, tribal, or private actions that are reasonably certain to
occur in the action area considered in [the] biological opinion.”36
The Services define “jeopardized the continued existence” as
To engage in an action that reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably
the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a
listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of that species.37
Until 2004 the Services defined “adverse modification” as “a direct
or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical
habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”38
Applicable actions altered the biological features that were initially
used to determine the habitat is critical.39 Unlike the factors considered
33
34

35

36

37
38

39

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4).
This consideration should include the action’s proximity, distribution, timing,
nature of the effect, duration, disturbance frequency, disturbance intensity, and
disturbance severity as related to the listed species. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
& NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, at 4-23–4-26.
The Services will analyze the action’s beneficial effects, direct effects,
interrelated and interdependent actions, and indirect effects. Id. at 4-26–4-29.
These include the number of individuals and populations the species will affect,
and the species’ sensitivity to change, resilience, and recovery rate. Id. at 4-30–
4-31.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009).
Id. Judicial intervention forced the Services to change their regulatory definition
of adverse modification. Infra Section V.
See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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in listing and jeopardy, the Services did not consider the cost of
designating critical habitat.40
In the past, the jeopardy and adverse modification definitions were
nearly substantively identical.41 In guidance, the Services attached a
threshold limitation, finding adverse modification should only exist if
the action “considerably reduce[d]” both the survival and recovery of
the listed species.42 Given the substantive overlap between the two
standards, this ambiguous threshold decreased the likelihood of an
adverse modification finding.43 In fact, the Services expressed their
belief of this overlap through promulgation of past regulatory
guidance44 which has since been reversed through court action in some
circuits.45 As recently as 2010, the Fish and Wildlife Services stated
that critical habitat adds no additional protections to the benefits of
jeopardy.46 This has come to be known as the “functional equivalence”
doctrine, and has been subject to much scrutiny by courts and
commentators.47 The Services rarely made a decision solely based on
an adverse modification finding, given their view of the standard being
redundant.48 Instead, many of the Services’ jeopardy49 and taking50
40

41

42

43
44

45
46

47
48

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012). The definition of critical habitat in the past
included qualifying scientific factors of a species’ relationship with a
surrounding geography known as “Primary Constituent Elements.” See also 50
C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5) (2009) (including such factors as spawning sites, seasonal
wetland and dryland, vegetation types, and soil types). These factors have been
slightly modified in the newly promulgated regulations. Infra Section VI.ii.
Beginning in the 1980’s, jeopardy was found when an action “directly or
indirectly, [appreciably reduced] the likelihood of both survival and recovery of
the listed species,” where adverse modification should be found if an action
“appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival and
recovery of listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5) (2009) (amended in 2016).
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25,
at 4-35.
Robbins, supra note 1, at 1098.
Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species
Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 (June 14, 1999).
Infra Section V.
Robbins, supra note 1, at 1106 (citing Critical Habitat, Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endngered/whatwe-do//critical-habitats-faq.html (last updated June 10, 2010)).
See Baynes, supra note 3, at 981; Robbins, supra note 1, at 1098.
Owen, supra note 24, at 166 (finding very few opinions to cite adverse
modification as the determinative reason for a Services action).
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analyses included extensive discussion of the action’s potential habitat
effect.
One possible reason for this perceived redundancy is the
unlikelihood of a federal action directly degrading a listed species
habitat without harming the individual members of the population.
Some federal projects may adversely modify a habitat, but not create
enough harm to justify a jeopardy or taking finding to the members of
the species.51 The degradation of unoccupied habitat would likely
apply to this scenario.52 The National Marine Fishery Service provides
an example of this occurrence with salmonid populations in
watersheds.53 In a guidance document, the agency articulates that
listed salmonids will “likely” be adversely affected if the baseline
conditions of their habitat are degraded.54 This degradation would
occur through the presence of “excess fine sediment, high cobble
embeddedness, or poor pool frequency/quality.”55 Although, such a
finding would not require the presence of the species in the habitat.56
Additionally, federal actions may also adversely modify habitat, but
have an uncertain effect on the species’ survival, invoking the adverse
modification standard but not jeopardy or taking.57 Determining the
destruction to an ecosystem is relatively easier than biologically
quantifying the likelihood of a species’ survival due to a certain
project.58 For example, clear-cutting a small section of forest inhabited
by a listed spotted owl may have an unclear impact on the individual

49

50

51
52
53

54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 153 (noting that every biological opinion analyzed in the study included
analysis of the project’s effect on a species habitat).
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009) (qualifying “jeopardize the continued existence” to
include effects on a species that could be caused by habitat destruction).
Owen, supra note 24, at 155.
See id.
See National Marine Fisheries Service, Making Endangered Species Act
Determinations of Effect for Individual or Grouped Actions at the Watershed
Scale
(Aug.
1996)
at
9,
http://www.oregon.gov/odot/hwy/geoenvironmental/docs/biology/nmfs_matrix.
pdf.
Id. at 9.
Id.
See id.
Owen, supra note 24, at 156.
See id.
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members of the population.59 On the other hand, such an action would
certainly destroy the owl’s habitat.60 In some instances, the availability
of data to understand these impacts could determine the possibility
such findings.61
In the past, the functional equivalence doctrine has also enabled
another assumption by the Services: the baseline doctrine.62 This
doctrine pertains to the Services’ calculation of the benefits associated
with critical habitat designations.63 The baseline approach involves
“comparing the state of the world without or before the [habitat]
designation, the baseline, with the state of the world with or after the
designation.”64 Only impacts protected by a critical habitat designation
above the jeopardy standard would be considered as a benefit, as the
Services explained in Cape Hatteras65 “on occupied critical habitat,
consultations and project modifications are likely to flow from the
listing of the species, and no additional consultations or project
modifications are likely to result as a ‘but-for’ effect of the critical
habitat designation.”66 Since the Services deemed the jeopardy and
adverse modification standard to be functionally the same (i.e. the
functional equivalence doctrine), the agencies rarely ever designated
critical habitat.67
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits rejected this approach, noting that the
functional equivalence doctrine effectively cut out the recovery
standard by only focusing on the survival of the listed species in
occupied habitat.68 The Tenth Circuit, while not directly striking down
59
60
61
62

63
64
65
66

67
68

See id.
Id.
See generally id.
Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. United States Dept. of Interior, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 108, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
See Baynes, supra note 3, at 990.
344 F. Supp. 2d at 127.
Id.
Defendant’s Brief in Opposition at 29, Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v.
United States Dept. of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03217).
See Baynes, supra note 3, at 978–79.
Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. Unites States Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
245 F.3d 434, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2001); infra Section V.
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the regulation, disagreed with the Services’ related reasoning.69 The
D.C. Circuit agreed with the baseline approach without substantively
considering functional equivalence.70 Citing Congress’ prohibition of
considering costs while listing a species, the court found that the
Services should only consider costs above those inherent in taking and
jeopardy designations.71
IV. THE APPLICATION OF PAST ADVERSE MODIFICATION AND
CRITICAL HABITAT STANDARDS
A. Critical Habitat Implementation
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Services used economic
exclusions to consistently rule against critical habitat designations.72 In
the early 2000s, the agencies changed their approach in response to a
Ninth Circuit decision striking down the Services’ economic analysis
approach.73 After the pervasion of economic cost-benefit analysis in
many different areas of federal law, the Services began to attempt to
monetarily quantify the cost and benefit of critical habitat
designations.74 Most of the Services’ efforts focused on the cost of
designation.75 The agencies’ methodology, however, included multiple
layers of assumptions, which compounded inaccuracies with estimated
data.76 Their approach included estimating the number of projects to
occur in the habitat during the next ten years, the resulting Section 7
consultations and associated project modifications, and the cost of
such modifications.77 These estimates included data from willingness69

70
71
72

73

74
75
76
77

See New Mexico Cattle Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277,
1284 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Cape Hatteras, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
Id.
Sinden, supra note 2, at 158. The Services only used economic considerations to
support a critical habitat designation once in this time period. See generally
Northern Spotted Owl Critical Habitat Designation, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (Jan. 15,
1992).
Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. 273 F.3d 1229,
1244 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the baseline utilized by the Services did not
adequately account for critical habitats added protection).
See Sinden, supra note 2, at 175.
Id. at 175.
See id. at 175–80.
Id.
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to-pay surveys—polling Americans as to the amount they would be
willing to pay to prevent the extinction of a species—and references to
other administrative guidance documents quantifying economic
benefits associated with the preservation of similar species.78
B. Biological Opinions’ Inclusion of Adverse Modification
Professor Owen of the University of Maine School of Law
completed an extensive analysis of how the Services implemented
adverse modification protections.79 The study includes the review of
4,000 biological opinions and interviews with agency staff.80 Owen
concluded that, though the adverse modification provisions should
have a significant independent legal effect, the implementation of the
standard reflects the Services’ perceived redundancy of the
provision.81 Furthermore, the Services have treated small-scale habitat
degradation as outside the purview of the adverse modification
standard.82 These problems are compounded by the fact that the
Services had not articulated a coherent standard explaining adverse
modification since 2004.83
Within the set of biological opinions analyzed by Professor Owen,
the Services found jeopardy and adverse modification 7.2% and 6.7%
of the time, respectively.84 Eighty percent of the opinions found taking
of a listed species to occur, and no jeopardy or adverse modification
finding.85 No biological opinion included adverse modification without
jeopardy.86 Also, critical habitat designations in areas affected by a
federal project have little impact on the findings articulated in
biological opinions.87 Professor Owen attributes the devaluing of this
protection to the Services’ classifying most effects on critical habitat
as minor, and falling below the threshold of “considerably reducing”
78
79
80
81
82
83

84
85
86
87

Id. at 182.
Owen, supra note 24, at 144.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Please note, however, that the Services have proposed new regulations
addressing this void, but have yet to give them effect. See infra Section V.
Owen, supra note 24, at 164.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 166.
Id.
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both the survival and recovery of the listed species.88 Interestingly, the
Services regularly attributed habitat modification as a partial reason to
issue a taking finding.89 Of the biological opinions examined by
Professor Owen, 84% of them anticipated a taking through habitat
modification.90
The Services’ utilization of other protections that indirectly protect
such habitats somewhat remediate the lack of adverse modification
findings.91 For example, as mentioned above, the Services and
consulting agencies have many opportunities to revise a project to
avoid the Services including a jeopardy or adverse modification
finding.92 The Services “almost always” addressed the threat of
adverse modification through measures mentioned above.93 In many
instances, the Services actually anticipated an overall benefit to the
area through the use of these measures.94
The threat of degradation to a critical habitat, however, makes little
difference to the level of protection afforded to a species habitat.95
Owen found little difference among biological opinions involving
critical habitat and those lacking such designation.96 However, some
subtle effects could exist with the presence of a critical habitat. 97 For
example, critical habitat designations slightly increased the likelihood
that action agencies would engage in informal consultation prior to the
formal process.98

88

89
90
91
92

93

94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 157. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
supra note 25, at 4-35.
Owen, supra note 24, at 170.
Id.
Id. at 146.
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25,
at 19-20.
Owen, supra note 24, at 170. These measures include reasonably prudent
measures, conservation measures, and conservation recommendations.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
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C. Limits of Professor Owen’s Findings
Professor Owen’s findings, though a nearly complete study of the
Services’ application of the ESA, does not paint the complete
picture.99 For example, Owen does not account for the preemptive
effect on land-use interests.100 Knowing the existence of a critical
habitat might change a party’s intended use of the land, and therefore
provides a selection bias in the examined data set.101 Given the extra
limitations on development within critical habitats, an agency would
hesitate to propose an action just to be struck down or severely altered
during the consultation process.102 Therefore, the actions analyzed by
the Services might already be altered by the action agency to avoid an
adverse modification finding, offering a possible explanation for the
Services’ lack of such findings.103
The ambiguous meaning of adverse modification might also
explain the results of Professor Owen’s study. His analysis includes
small impacts to critical habitat as possibly being considered adverse
modification.104 The Services, however, may only allow for large
impacts to qualify under the standard, given the large economic costs
associated with critical habitat designations.105
D. Perceived Amount of Litigation Resulting from Specific
Biological Opinions
Professor Owen’s paper also contradicts the unfounded belief of
some commentators that the consultation process involves extensive
litigation.106 His study only found twenty-six judicial decisions
specifically invoking the adverse modification prohibition.107 To put
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

106
107

Turner & McGrath, supra note 21, at 10679–80.
See id.
See id. at 10,679.
See id. at 10,679–80.
Owen, supra note 24, at 166.
Turner & McGrath, supra note 21, at 10,680.
See Sinden, supra note 2, at 168–174 (commenting on the reluctance of the
Services to designate critical habitat due to the perceived low extra value
designation provided for the protection of the species compared to the very large
cost to construction interests through future Section 7 consultations).
Owen, supra note 24, at 175.
Id. at 177. Interestingly, plaintiffs have won these challenges nineteen of the
twenty-six cases. Id.
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the small size into perspective, the Services issued 4,000 biological
opinions between 2005 and 2009 just for fish species.108 When the
courts consider both standards, they treat them as separate issues.109
Adverse modification mostly holds separate legal weight, though its
invocation differs between jurisdictions.110 Professor Owen concludes
his study by stating that the Services have replaced the adverse
modification standard with a more discretionary approach, which
permits the incremental degradation of critical habitat. 111 He
postulates, however, that the insertion of discretionary power may be a
shrewd political move rather than an example of agency capture.112
Through reasonable and prudent measures attached to a project, the
Services avoid the inflexible structure of the adverse modification
standard.113 Furthermore, they can give concessions to construction
interests while also attaching caveats to benefit a listed species critical
habitat.114 The main issue heading forward is fitting this flexibility into
rigid statutorily-mandated factors, which the Services can address by
including a large set of factors in their adverse modification
standard.115

108
109
110

111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 176.
Id. at 178.
Compare Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 97-36159, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3860 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999) (finding the jeopardy standard to fully
include adverse modification), with Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., No. 09–CV–8011–PCT–PGR, 2011 WL 4551175 (D. Ariz.
2011) (requiring a full recovery analysis in adverse modification finding). See
Owen, supra note 24, at 178–79 (noting that some courts have criticized the
Services for allowing incremental habitat degradation, while others have
explicitly allowed a step-wise relationship to exist between critical habitat
degradation and adverse modification).
Owen, supra note 24, at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 186.
Id.
See e.g. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (requiring critical habitat to be occupied by the
listed species, or essential to the conservation of the species and require special
management considerations).
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V. COURTS REVIEW OF THE SERVICES’ INTERPRETATION OF THE
ESA STANDARDS
Several appellate courts have held that the past standard for
adverse modification was contrary both to the statute and the
Congressional intent of the ESA. These cases attacked the prohibition
of federal actions “appreciably diminish[ing] the value of critical
habitat to the conservation of a listed species.”116 The main issue with
this standard involved the effective exclusion of the recovery
protection for listed species.
A. Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service
The first case addressing the Services’ standard involved the
decision not to delineate a critical habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon, a
listed species.117 In its biological opinion, the Services concluded that
a critical habitat finding would “not provide any additional benefit to
the species beyond other statutory regimes and conservation programs
in place.118 The Fifth Circuit overruled the decision due to the
Services’ interpretation of the adverse modification standard, which
required a decreased chance of both the survival and recovery of a
species.119 This rule effectively read out the consideration of a species’
recovery, as recovery is a smaller subset subsumed by survival. 120 Any
action that would affect survival would also impact recovery, but the
reverse was not true.121 In its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit referenced
the Congressional intent of the ESA “to bring any endangered species
or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided [by
the ESA] are no longer necessary.”122 Furthermore, since the ESA
defines critical habitat to include areas “essential to conservation” of a
listed species—and conservation includes more than just survival—the
Services’ focus solely on the survival of a species was improper.123
116
117

118
119
120
121
122
123

50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009) (amended in 2016).
Sierra Club v. Unites States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 436–37 (5th
Cir. 2001).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 440–41.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 438 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2012)).
Id. at 441–443.
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B. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
The Services, however, did not immediately change the adverse
modification standard. Instead, another case in 2004 forced the
Services to abandon their old interpretation. Gifford Pinchot124
involved the challenge of six biological opinions permitting the
harvesting of timber and taking of Northern Spotted Owl in the
Northwest Forest of Oregon.125 The court began by explicitly allowing
critical habitat modification to be considered in the Services’ jeopardy
analysis, citing the ambiguity of the ESA as affording the agency wide
discretion in determining jeopardy findings.126 The court then
addressed the issue of adverse modification applying to both recovery
and survival of a listed species.127 The court noted that the regulations’
singular focus became survival because “it is logical and inevitable
that a species requires more critical habitat for recovery than is
necessary for species survival.”128 Therefore, the agency could
effectively ignore the recovery of a listed species, which was one of
the main motivations Congress possessed in enacting the ESA.129 The
Services argued that the protection was implicitly included in their
issued biological opinions.130 The court answered this assertion by
analyzing each biological opinion involved in the case, searching for
any references to the recovery standard.131 Though the agency briefly
mentioned the existence of a recovery standard in one biological
opinion, it did not adequately relate to an adverse modification
finding.132 Consequently, the language of the biological opinion did
not prove “that the agency [had] . . . ignored their own regulation,
and . . . considered species recovery.”133

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1062–63.
Id. at 1065–67.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1072–75.
Id. at 1073–74.
Id. at 1074.
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VI. SERVICES’ REACTION TO JUDICIAL REJECTION
A. Adverse Modification Findings
Due to these cases, the Services disavowed their past interpretation
of adverse modification in December 2004, and instructed staff to rely
only on the statutory definition.134 After a period of using the
ambiguous statute, the Services have recently proposed new
regulations to define adverse modification and critical habitat, which
the agency finalized in February, 2016.135 In the final action, the
agency amended the interpretation of both standards to more closely
follow the ESA and separate the adverse modification from jeopardy
analyses under Section 7.136 The new definition of adverse
modification is a “direct or indirect alteration that appreciably
diminishes the value of critical habitat for the conservation of a listed
species.”137 In the regulatory guidance for the new rule, the agency
134

135

136

137

Letter from Marshall Jones, Department of Interior Director, to Regional
Directors, Department of Interior, Application of the “Destruction or Adverse
Modification” Standard under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act
(Dec.
9,
2004),
http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/files/2011/01/AdverseModification-Guidance.pdf.
See Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,060 (May 12, 2014); Final Rule on Definition
of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7214
(Feb. 11, 2016); Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of
the Endangered Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27052 (May 12, 2014); Final Rule on
Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 81
Fed. Reg. 7413 (Feb. 11, 2016); Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the
Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066 (May 12,
2014); Final Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 7226 (Feb. 11, 2016).
Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,061; Final Rule on Definition of Destruction or
Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7216. The proposed
and final rule substantively implement the same requirements upon the Service’s
implementation of adverse modification. In the final rule, the Service only alters
some minor aesthetic changes to accommodate comments. See Proposed Rule
on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 79
Fed. Reg. at 27061; Final Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse
Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7216.
Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,061 (explaining that such alterations “may include,
but are not limited to, effects that preclude or significantly delay the
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notes the term “conservation value” is intended to capture the role that
critical habitat should play in the recovery of a species.138 Specifically,
the rule will accommodate “ephemeral or dynamic habitat
conditions.”139 The Services elaborate that such actions affecting
recovery include those that “preclude or significantly delay habitat
regeneration or natural successional processes.”140 To interpret the
magnitude of an impact, the Services will examine the quantity and
quality of life-sustaining features present in the habitat benefitting the
recovery of a listed species.141 Furthermore, an action’s effect on the
future generation of these features within a critical habitat will be
taken into account.142 The presence of a listed species within the
affected habitat is not necessary to qualify for an adverse modification
finding.143
Similarly to the past regulatory framework, once the agency
determines the conservation value of a habitat, the Services should
determine whether the action “appreciably diminish[es]” the value of a
the critical habitat.144 The new regulations have removed
“considerably” from the definition of adverse modification: “to
considerably reduce the capability” of a habitat to provide for survival

138

139

140

141
142
143

144

development of the physical or biological features that support the life-history
needs of the species for recovery”).
Id. at 27,601. Again, the final rule incorporates the proposed rule by only
making minor changes to word choice. Final Rule on Definition of Destruction
or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7216 (“These
revisions avoid introducing previously undefined terms without changing the
meaning of the proposed definition.”).
Final Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7217.
Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,061 (stating that such actions would include those
that affect “food, water, light, shelter from predators, competitors, weather and
physical space to carry out normal behaviors or provide dispersal or migratory
corridors”).
Id. at 27,062.
Id.
Id. This is one of the main issues raised by eighteen states currently challenging
the new rule. The states argue that the rule grants the Services unlimited power
to designate any land critical habitat, regardless of the current presence of any
ecological functions. See Complaint of Plaintiffs, Alabama v. National Marine
Fisheries Services, No. 16-953 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2016).
Id.
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and recovery.145 The agencies reason that deleting the modifier will
reduce the variability during the consultation process, as
“considerable” could mean “large in amount or extent” or “worthy of
consideration.”146 Consequently, the central question is now whether
the reduction of the critical habitat is “appreciable” to the conservation
value of the critical habitat. The Services have noted that appreciable
will mean, “to recognize the quality, significance, or magnitude,” and
not “noticeable” or “meaningful.”147 An action’s effect on the entire
critical habitat’s conservation value will be considered, not just the
area where an action takes place.148 Furthermore, the Services will
start completing separate jeopardy and adverse modification
analyses.149 The agencies admit, however, the standards could overlap
depending on whether an occupied habitat contains the necessary
biological and physical characteristics for the conservation of the listed
species.150 Seemingly, an occupied area not possessing these features
could only be subject to a jeopardy analysis.
B. Critical Habitat Designations
In concurrence with the rule modifying the adverse modification
standard, the Services have also proposed the altering of critical
habitat designations.151 These changes are important because an
adverse modification finding requires the presence of a critical

145
146
147
148
149

150
151

Id. at 27,063.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27,064. This change will effectively alter the procedure the Services use to
enable the functional equivalence doctrine.
Id.
See Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066 (May 12, 2014); Final Rule on
Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 81
Fed. Reg. 7413 (Feb. 11, 2016). No substantive differences exist between the
proposed and final regulations. Final Rule on Implementing Changes to the
Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7414 (“the
amendments make minor edits to the scope and purpose, add and remove some
definitions, and clarify the criteria and procedures for designating critical
habitat.”). The only substantive definition the Services removed was
“interbreeds when mature” out of the definition of “species”. Id. at 7424. Other
changes involve minor, non-substantive details.
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habitat.152 The new rules elaborate the procedures for designating
critical habitats by following more closely the statutory language of
the ESA153 and clarify the meaning of “geographic area occupied by
the species” in which the Services may delineate a critical habitat.154
The language of the new rules states that land permanently or
temporarily used by a listed species during some portion of its life
would qualify as occupied.155 Since Congress articulated that critical
habitat should be within this area, occupied territory (i.e. the range of a
listed species) will be more expansive than critical habitat.156
Certain parts of occupied areas may only be designated as critical
habitat if they possess the “physical or biological features essential to
the conservation of the species.”157 The language mirrors the relevant
statute to eliminate ambiguity.158 These features will be defined as “the
features that support the life-history needs of the species,”159 and do
not need to be consistently present to be considered essential.160
152
153

154
155

156

157

158

159

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,069–70 (May 12, 2014) (citing 16
§ 1532(5)).
Id. at 27,068–69 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
Id. at 27,069 (citing Arizona Cattle Growers’ Assoc. v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160
(9th Cir. 2010) (elaborating that areas of periodic use may include breeding
areas, foraging areas, and migratory corridors)). To illustrate the periodic
occupancy, the regulations use an extreme example of cicadas occupying their
range only one month every thirteen or seventeen years. Id.
Id. at 27,069 (citing § 1531(5)(A)(i)). The range of the species at the time of
listing will be used by the Services, unless insufficient data exists to make such
a determination. In that case, the Services may use current data regarding the
listed species range. Id. (citing Otay Mesa Prop. L.P. v. DOI, 714 F. Supp. 2d 73
(D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 646 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
Id. at 27,072 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(1)(iii)). The Services will
also add “recovery” as part of the meaning of conservation. Id.
Id. at 27,069 (referencing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (2012) (“on which are
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the
species and (II) which may require special management considerations or
protection.”)). “Primary Constituent Elements,” the old qualifying factor, has
been erased from regulations.
Id. at 27,069. The regulations elaborate many different factors that will define
the life-history needs of a listed species: “including but not limited to water
characteristics, soil type, geological features, sites, prey, vegetation, symbiotic
species, or other features. A feature may be a single habitat characteristic, or a
more complex combination of habitat characteristics. Features may include
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Furthermore, the designation of critical habitats will be limited to
those areas requiring “special management protections.”161 Contrary to
past regulations, the Services will not consider whether a current
management system exists.162 Furthermore, a management system may
not currently be necessary, but may be implemented to protect against
future degradation to a critical habitat.163 If the essential features are
not threatened, however, the Services will not find a system necessary
and will pass on making a critical habitat designation.164 Although, the
agencies expect this to occur infrequently.165
Compared to the past rules, the proposed changes to critical habitat
designations grant more flexibility to the Services.166 For example, the
Services’ have much discretion to deem threats insufficient to warrant
a designation, especially if the current threat to a listed species is
separate from any habitat alterations (e.g. disease).167 They can now
allow construction to occupy an area with listed species as long as the
species’ life-history needs are not threatened.168 Under the proposed
regulations, the Services will determine the geographic area occupied
by the species, and then identify the essential features within the
area.169 Furthermore, contrary to the past interpretation of “specific
areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species” requiring
the protection of all occupied areas before addressing unoccupied
habitat, the Services will now consider unoccupied areas concurrently
with occupied lands.170 To accommodate future effects of climate
change, the Services can designate unoccupied areas that may develop

160
161
162

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

habitat characteristics that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat conditions.
Features may also be expressed in terms relating to principles of conservation
biology, such as patch size, distribution distances, and connectivity.” Id.
Id. at 27,069–70.
Id. at 27,070 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (2012)).
Id. (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D.
Ariz. 2003)).
Id. at 27,070.
Id. at 27,070–72 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.12).
Id.
Id. at 27,071–73.
Id. at 27,071.
Id.
Id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(1)).
Id. at 27,073.
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essential conservation features in the future.171 Furthermore, contrary
to past regulations, the new rules do not require the designation of
unoccupied habitat only after the exhaustion of a listed species’ current
range.172 Unoccupied habitat, however, must still be considered
“essential” to the conservation of a species.173
Critical habitat exclusions will also allow the Services more
flexibility to implement ESA protections,174 as Congress only forbids
exclusions from critical habitat if such exclusion would result in the
extinction of a listed species.175 As mentioned above, one type of
exclusion is related to economic burdens imposed by a critical habitat
designation.176 As part of this economic analysis, the Services will use
the baseline method to calculate the benefits and costs of habitat
designations (i.e. weighing the cost and benefit between a world with
and without critical habitat designation).177 With the new regulations,
the Services have most likely conformed to external pressures
171

172

173

174

175

176

177

Id. Recently, eighteen states have challenged this added protection to the rule.
See Complaint of Plaintiffs, Alabama v. National Marine Fisheries Services, No.
16-953 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2016).
Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,073 (May 12, 2014).
Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (“The term ‘critical habitat’ means . . .
specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species . . . essential
for the conservation for the species.”) with id. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (“The term
‘critical habitat’ means . . . specific areas within the geographic area occupied by
a species . . . on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special
management considerations or protection.”).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012) (“The Secretary may exclude any area from
critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the
benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat.”).
Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27052, 27,053 (May 12, 2014) (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(2) (2012)); Final Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2)
of the Endangered Species Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 7226, 7227 (Feb. 11, 2016) (listing
the differences from the proposed rule, which are only aesthetic).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make
revisions thereto, under subsection (a)(3) on the basis of the best scientific data
available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on
national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular
area as critical habitat.”) (emphasis added).
Final Rule for Revisions to the Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical
Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,062 (Aug. 28, 2013).
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regarding monetary judgments, as a recent Executive Order demanded
the Services give more consideration to excluding private lands from
critical habitat designations and adopt the least burdensome means of
promoting compliance with the ESA.178 In 2013, the Services began to
permit the cost-benefit evaluation of critical habitat designation to be
in quantitative or qualitative terms.179
In more recent regulations, the Services stated that it will consider
the incremental cost of a critical habitat designation compared to the
corresponding increase in conservation value, rather than requiring a
certain monetary threshold to be met.180 This incremental approach
involves calculating the cost of improving the conservation value of
the habitat, and comparing the cost to the conservation value added
through designation.181 The regulations do not articulate a
methodology for converting the added conservation value to a
monetary amount.182
The new regulations deem the presence of partnerships and
conservations plans between state and local parties to be included in
the baseline of a proposed critical habitat.183 The agencies look very
favorably on private and other non-federal conservations plans because
they involve private landowners who otherwise could not be included
in Section 7 consultations.184 The agencies consider any benefits of
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180

181

182

183
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Presidential Document No. 2012–5369, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Feb. 28, 2012).
Final Rule for Revisions to the Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical
Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,060 (Aug. 28, 2013).
Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,052, 27,056 (May 12, 2014). As mentioned above,
the final rule is substantively the same as the proposed. See Final Policy
Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 81
Fed. Reg. 7226, 7227 (Feb. 11, 2016).
Final Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7227 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012)).
Importantly, this statement codifies the baseline doctrine.
See id; Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,052 (May 12, 2014).
Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,054–55.
Id. at 27,054–55. The specific plans mentioned in the regulations include habitat
conservation plan (HCP), safe harbor agreement (SHA), and candidate
conservation agreements with assurances (CCAA). HCPs accompany incidental
take permits to accommodate partnerships between non-federal entities
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critical habitat designation to be minimal due to the existing
protections afforded by the plans.185
Federal lands do not benefit from such agreements, as Section 7
consultations must proceed regardless of any existing agreement
between federal actors.186 The Services reason, since any project with
a federal nexus must complete a Section 7 consultation, one of the
only benefits from a conservation plan would be to avoid
administrative or transactional costs associated with the
consultation.187 Avoiding these costs is not a sufficient benefit to
warrant an exclusion.188 The only other benefit from conservation
plans on lands with a federal nexus comes from avoiding burdens
associated with adverse modification findings.189 To avoid regulatory
burdens on non-federal lands, the Services plan to focus critical habitat
designations on federal lands.190
VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGE
The Services obviously responded directly to the judicial
protestations of the recovery exclusion in the former regulations, as the
agencies include specific language in the new regulation to ensure that
the adverse modification standard accommodates the recovery of listed
species.191 The Services note that critical habitats outside of the current
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186

187
188
189
190

191

minimizing impacts to a listed species within its habitat. CCAAs and SHAs are
agreements to protect listed species on non-federal lands. Id.
Id. at 27,054. The Services will grant exclusions in such circumstances when
three conditions are met: (1) The permitted parties are properly executing the
conservation plan; (2) The conservation plans applies to the species relevant to a
critical habitat designation; and (3) the conservation plan specifically addresses
the species habitat and meets the conservation needs of the species.
Id. at 27,056. Any action on federal land would automatically be considered a
federal action and thus invoke a Section 7 consultation.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. This statement does not have large implications, as only projects with a
federal nexus will be subject to critical habitat designations. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (2012).
See Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27060, 27061 (May 12, 2014) (to be codified in
50 C.F.R. § 424.02 (2015)) (“Specifically, the term ‘conservation value’ is
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occupied habitat of a listed species fall within the purview of the
adverse modification standard, further promoting recovery.192 The new
rule also separates the jeopardy and adverse modification standards,
stating the former should focus on critical habitat while the latter
should focus on the status of the species.193 This language seemingly
overrules the functional equivalence doctrine utilized by the Services
for many years and rejected by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.194
A. How Will the Services Implementation of the Act Change?
Using the results of Professor Owens’ study, one can raise the
question of how these changes will be implemented, since the vast
majority of biological opinions ignore adverse modification.195 The
new regulations have created a large vacuum by effectively
constructing a new standard under Section 7.196
Two outcomes seem possible: (1) maintain the status quo by
transferring taking and jeopardy findings focused on habitat
degradation to an adverse modification label, or (2) enlarge the
substantive restrictions on federal projects.
The factors used in past and current adverse modification schemes
contain no large differences in substantive quality. The conservation
value sought to be protected in the new regulations is nearly identical
to the ecological features shielded by the old rules.197 To understand
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193
194

195
196
197

intended to capture the role that critical habitat should play for the recovery of
the listed species.”).
Id. at 27,062.
Id. at 27,061.
See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d
1059, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. Unites States Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
245 F.3d 434, 445–47 (5th Cir. 2001). The applicable regulation also contains
this reasoning. Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse
Modification of Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,060, 27,061–62 (May 12,
2014).
Owen, supra note 24, at 163-67.
Id. at 150-152.
Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066, 27061 (May 12, 2014) (“The proposed
definition of ‘physical or biological features,’ described above, would
encompass similar habitat characteristics as currently described in section
424.12(b) . . .”); Compare Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or
Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,060, 27,062 (May 12,
2014) (defining conservation value as the quantity and quality of features to
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the habitat characteristics that need to be protected, the new
regulations suggest the Services look to the life-history needs of the
listed species relied upon in the critical habitat designation, similarly
to the past regulatory structure.198 Consequently, the only differences
seem to involve the degree, not substance, of the Services’
consideration of factors necessary for species protection. The
threshold’s lowering to include recovery is the largest impact of the
new regulations.
It is unclear whether this greater degree of protection
accommodates the flexibility suggested in Professor Owen’s paper.199
Given that the Services will consider the same substantive factors
while making adverse modification determinations, but lower the
threshold (i.e. the inclusion of the recovery standard), one has a
difficult time predicting whether this will alter the Services’ latitude in
accommodating both construction and preservation interests. The
Services note that action agencies do not have an affirmative duty to
enable the recovery of a species.200 Instead, the incorporation of the
recovery standard only prohibits destructive actions.201 Given that
most consultations result in reasonable and prudent measures that
benefit the habitat of a species while accommodating construction, the
new threshold may not detrimentally affect development interests as
first suspected.202 The lower threshold will most likely not
significantly impact the procedure of the consultation process, as
concessions can be made to avoid negatively altering the recovery of a

198

199
200

201
202

support the life-history needs for species recovery) with 50 C.F.R. § 402.02,
424.12(b)(5) (2009) (amended 2016) (defining the basis of a habitat being
“critical” to include such factors as spawning sites, seasonal wetland and
dryland, vegetation types, and soil types). See Services Handbook 4-23–4-31
(listing factors the agency uses to determine a habitat critical).
Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,062.
Owen, supra note 24, at 162.
Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27062–63.
Id. at 27063.
Owen, supra note 24, at 142.
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listed species.203 These concessions, however, will have to comply
with the stricter recovery standard.204
Another fairly large concern stems from the lower threshold’s
effect on critical habitat designations. The inclusion of the recovery
standard will alter the functional equivalence and baseline doctrines
upon which the Services relied for most biological opinions.205 After
the approval of the regulation, the adverse modification and critical
habitat standards are now the only provision protecting recovery.206
Therefore, the functional equivalence doctrine is no longer valid.
The Services codified the baseline doctrine in the proposed
regulations.207 The extra benefit posed by critical habitat protection
will now include recovery, differing from listing and jeopardy
determinations which only focus on survival. The question remains,
however, as to whether this added benefit will be enough to cause an
increase in critical habitat designations. Given the Services’ discretion
in determining the weight of this new addition and possibility of
adverse modification, the effect on the number of critical habitat
designations is hard to predict. The Services can now designate
unoccupied habitat not yet possessing ecological features necessary to
support a listed species.208 As mentioned above, however, the
proposed regulations will allow the Services much flexibility in
deciding the economic benefit of a project judged against the added
conservation value, the size of a project to define the possible scope of
critical habitat, and the determination of qualifying habitat. Judging
from the evidence presented in Professor Owen’s paper describing the
Services as a shrewd political actor, this study conjectures the agencies
will use this flexibility to compromise between construction and
203

204

205

206

207

208

Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,054.
Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
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Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
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conservation interests, and the amount of critical habitat designation
will not change dramatically.209
VIII. WILL THE CHANGE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
The new regulations seem to transfer agency discretion by
allowing the Services much more flexibility in determining whether
critical habitat is necessary and lowering the threshold for an adverse
modification finding.
The determination of what habitat is “essential to the conservation
of a species” within an occupied area will be the subject of much
debate. Although the Services will examine an action’s effect on an
entire critical habitat to determine adverse modification, critical habitat
designations will be subject to more discretion. The scope examined
by the Services may be enlarged or minimized to correspond with the
presence of biological factors.210 To avoid a critical habitat
designation, the scope of the area considered occupied by a species
could technically be maximized to prove a certain area is not essential
to the population’s conservation.211
The Services may also use exclusions to reach foregone
conclusions in critical habitat designations. The Secretary may invoke
cost-benefit analysis when he or she chooses.212 Costs of making
habitat improvements will now be compared to the related increase in
conservation value.213 Given that critical habitat is the only ESA
protection including the recovery of a species, the calculated benefit of
a critical habitat designations will consist only of the recovery standard
(i.e. the baseline doctrine). The balancing test will consequently weigh
the costs of conservation protections with the added value to a listed
species’ recovery, with both values subject to the discretion of the
Services.
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Owen, supra note 24, at 187.
Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066, 27071 (May 12, 2014).
Id. at 27071 – 72.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); Final Rule for Revisions to the Regulations for
Impact Analyses of Critical Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,062 (Aug. 28,
2013).
Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066, 27071 – 72 (May 12, 2014).
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Most importantly, the Services can use qualitative factors in the
new economic analysis designating critical habitat. The use of these
factors will not pigeonhole the agencies into attempting to monetarily
quantify ecological and environmental benefits. Activities that can
easily be monetized—future construction activities, cost of Section 7
consultations, etc.—can be quantified and then compared to less
definite factors, such as the ecological benefit of a species. Policy
holders can then realistically judge whether the recovery of a species
in a certain area is worth a calculated amount of money. This
discretion follows the Congressional intent of the Act,214 and grants
the Services the ability to better judge both construction and
preservation interests.
As Professor Owen notes, most projects involve developmental
interests slightly altering their projects to avoid adversely modifying
the critical habitat of a listed species.215 However, this empirical
observation requires the presence of already-established critical
habitat. Given the new stringent adverse modification standard
incorporating recovery, cunning developmental interests should begin
preemptively ensuring that projects do not possibly affect an area with
listed species, irrespective the existence of a critical habitat. Unlike
adverse modification, critical habitat designations include a costbenefit analysis216 and incorporate state and local plans conservation
plans in the baseline.217 Since a designation of a critical habitat would
be easier to evade then adverse modification, a focus on avoiding the
former would be the best course for developmental interests. Unlike
adverse modification findings, which arise in Section 7 consultations,
construction interests will not be externally motivated to recognize the
importance of critical habitat designations. If developmental interests
recognize this shift, they could start organizing to ensure projects do
not significantly threaten a listed species habitat, and avoid any critical
214
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124 Cong. Rec. 38,132 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Murphy)
(“The real tragedy associated with massive species extinction is that we may
never fully comprehend what we have lost.”); see Sinden, supra note 2, at 193–
96.
Owen, supra note 24, at 171–72.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); Final Rule for Revisions to the Regulations for
Impact Analyses of Critical Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,062 (Aug. 28,
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Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27052, 27,054–55 (May 12, 2014).
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habitat designation. Therefore, developmental interest can avoid the
harsh teeth of the adverse modification standard and construct on their
own terms, while preserving the recovery and survival of threatened or
endangered species.
The Services’ move away from designating unoccupied habitats
only after maximizing critical habitat in occupied areas may prove the
most dramatic change in the entire regulations. As mentioned above,
contrary to past regulations, the Services’ may designate unoccupied
habitat independent of the designation of occupied habitat. 218 The
wording of the ESA regarding the occupied and unoccupied distinction
is very similar; however, the new regulations do not seem to treat the
two standards differently.219 The Services note that the only difference
is that “essential” physical or biological features need not be present in
unoccupied habitat to warrant designation.220
The Services may exploit this fact to designate many unoccupied
areas not currently holding essential features to dramatically increase
designations; although, this path seems to eradicate the statutory
language that separates unoccupied and occupied habitat.221 Although
this change presents a possibility for the Services to dramatically
increase designations in such areas, the actual implementation of these
regulations remains unclear. Before the regulations were promulgated,
the Services noted that informal consultations have started to occur
more frequently for unoccupied habitat.222 These informal
consultations could prevent construction interests from threatening the
necessary ecological functions for species conservation. But, the
Services have also indicated a greater willingness to designate
unoccupied habitat, 223 meaning that the change could not only affect
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Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating
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Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (“The term ‘critical habitat’ means . . .
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‘critical habitat’ means . . . specific areas within the geographic area occupied by
a species . . . on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special
management considerations or protection.”).
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See § 1532(5).
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the types of land designated, but also the quantitative amount of
habitat designated. Similarly, the Services’ intent to protect
undeveloped physical and biological features in unoccupied habitat
suggests the agencies plan to designate more land,224 rather than just
different types of land. Eighteen states are currently challenging this
aspect of the rule in federal court,225 so the Services responses in that
litigation could shed light on their planned implementation.
Going forward, the change in the Services’ interpretation of the
adverse modification and critical habitat provisions will be evident in
certain metrics. If the Services seriously incorporate the recovery
standard in adverse modification judgments, then areas with already
existing critical habitats should see a rise in adverse modification
findings due to the incorporation of the recovery standard. The
standard will protect the same type of environmental quality as past
regulations, just to a larger extent. Similarly, if the Services seek to
minimize the effect of the change, the number of taking and jeopardy
findings citing the destruction of habitat should decrease to
compensate for the increase in adverse modification findings.
On the other hand, the Services will demonstrate their political
awareness if the rate of critical habitat designations remains constant,
or even lowers, to compensate for the increase in adverse modification
findings. Although the Services effectively ignored such designations
for decades, Congress actually provided much flexibility for the
standard’s implementation. Consistent with their past strategic
implementation of the Act, the Services will most likely use all of this
flexibility, and avoid making too many critical habitat designations in
order to avoid political backlash.
IX. CONCLUSION
The change to the adverse modification and critical habitat
standards present an opportunity for the Services to utilize flexibility
critical to the proper implementation of the ESA. Instead of
awkwardly forcing an accommodating regulatory structure by ignoring
statutory language and entire ESA protections, the Services can work
within the prescribed structure mandated by Congress. The added
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Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,062.
See Complaint of Plaintiffs, Alabama v. National Marine Fisheries Services, No.
16-953 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2016).
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discretion also allows the Services to avoid large changes to the status
quo. Consequently, the new regulations enable the Services to protect
listed and threatened species while also accommodating
developmental interests, a necessity in realistic ESA implementation.

